Chicago manager Frank Klopas saw what every coach in MLS now sees. Defeating the Galaxy depends upon forcing turnovers in the middle of the park to expose the defense, and limiting counter attacks orchestrated by Galaxy midfield wizard Riqui Puig.
Houston manager Ben Olson tucked a winger inside next to midfield general Hector Herrera. The Galaxy found themselves outnumbered in the middle of the field with their wingers isolated. When Puig launched one of his his signature drives with the ball through the middle, Houston recovered it and the Galaxy scrambled to regain their shape. As Galaxy manager Greg Vanney put it, “We found ourselves always behind the game. Never really able to catch up and get our defensive shape.”
Klopas trotted out five defenders at the back, marking Galaxy striker Miguel Berry out of the game limiting passing options when Puig drove through the middle. Vanney used the same language to describe the first half in Chicago, “We found ourselves unable to get a hold on the game, always behind the play.”
Like Houston, Chicago attacked quickly after recovering the ball in the middle through their two strikers. Brian Gutierrez and Dutch designated player Hugo Cuypers scored either side of half time to secure the victory for the Fire.
Like the Houston game, the Galaxy made some adjustments in the second half, inserting forward Dejan Jovelic next to Berry and moving DP winger Gabriel Pec across into different positions to create overloads. This time, however, the Galaxy lacked the cutting edge to score, despite creating good opportunities.
Logic would suggest that the Galaxy would improve game over game, adjusting their shape to counteract overloads. Instead the problem continues to surface and the players require halftime adjustments from their coaches. Buoyed by the home crowd, the Gs found enough energy to overcome the Dynamo, but could not muster enough to draw level in Chicago.
Even experienced players like Maya Yoshida, Martin Caceres, Mark Delgado and Diego Fagundez who favor Vanney’s possession-based system cannot seem to solve relatively straightforward problems on their own. Vanney hints at it but never really says it outright. “We cannot give the ball up in bad spots. Movement for the sake of movement doesn’t help us if we don’t create overloads.”
Both comments lead back to one player. The player who never comes off the pitch, even when the Galaxy take the lead. He plays every minute of every game, except when sitting out for yellow card accumulation. Even for heavily rotated lineups like the game in Chicago, he plays ninety minutes. Riqui Puig.
Puig-ball wants to create transitions through the middle where Riqui can orchestrate at top speed. It requires movement from teammates that open space for Puig to run and lanes for him to pick a pass. Midfielders and defenders behind the play must sprint forward in support to recover the ball if the attack breaks down.
When Puig-ball fails, Riqui gestures to his teammates, wanting more movement, exchanging positions, quicker passes, higher speed. With the acquisition of speedy wingers Gabriel Pec and Joseph Paintsil, Puig-ball scores goals, approximate twenty-five out of the Galaxy total of thirty-one. But it also accounts for at least eight of the goals against from turnovers that expose the defense.
Calculating the cost in goals against can be difficult because not every goal results directly from the turnover. The Galaxy foul in dangerous spots after Puig-ball turnovers in the middle of the park. Corner kicks and restart goals plagued the Galaxy early in the season. Despite improved dead ball defense, Puig-ball continues to cause restarts. When according to Vanney, the team finds itself chasing the game and forcing the ball into the middle, he speaks about the effects of Puig-ball without mentioning it directly.
Vanney-ball clearly works. When the Galaxy move the ball quickly and create overloads, they not only score goals, but prevent them as well. General manager Will Kuntz explicitly stated that he took the job at Galaxy because he wants to work with Vanney. Both Vanney and Kuntz inherited Puig from former scout Jovan Kirovski’s connections in Europe. Puig-ball pulls apart the system that makes Vanney-ball successful.
Puig can play Vanney-ball, as games against Dallas, Seattle and San Jose show. But Puig-ball continues to dominate the first half of important games, continuously putting the Galaxy behind and forcing them expend extra energy to claim points.
Other coaches rest their DP attacking midfielders when the team takes the lead or through player rotation. Why do Kuntz and Vanney play Puig when they rest everyone else? Why does Vanney continue to allow Puig to dictate the game on the field before taking over at halftime to make adjustments?
Perhaps they realize that Riqui cannot be told what to do, he must come to those decisions himself. At Barcelona Xavi solved the problem by selling Puig to the Galaxy, a luxury Kuntz and Vanney cannot afford. So he plays as long as he wants to play, with or without injuries.
He works his magic until it causes problems and Vanney coaches him up by pointing out the problems that need to be solved. In Dallas the Galaxy scored without involvement by Puig. The Galaxy sit near the top of the table, so Vanney continues to preach his principles, hoping that Puig will eventually buy in.
But at what cost? Delgado and Cerrillo struggled in the last twenty minutes of the Chicago game, clearly gassed. Pec and Puig both lacked that last bit of energy necessary to score a goal or make the pass. Puig-ball takes a toll on the whole team. Vanney carefully manages minutes to prevent injuries long term. He knows from last season the toll Puig-ball can take on his players.
The Galaxy signed a new contract with Puig that runs through 2027. It could be that the Galaxy brass want to showcase Puig to drive up his value. Perhaps if a world class player that favors Vanney-ball joins the team, it will force Puig to make a decision, incorporate Vanney-ball or play Puig-ball somewhere else.